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ABSTRACT 
Recent research has focused on institutional impacts on the implementation of PPP 
policies, specifically the role that the institutional and political context play in the process of 
developing PPP projects, and mostly analyzing contexts with similar institutional traditions. 
To contribute to the current state of the art, this paper attempts to answer the question of how 
the institutional environment affects project outcomes in PPP development in the road sector 
through a comparative analysis of two environments with very different institutional traditions 
- the Netherlands and Tamil Nadu (India) - but with similar project volumes and a comparable 
history of PPPs in the road sector. The maturity of the institutional environment for PPPs was 
comparable when both regions embarked upon PPP programs. However, the evolutions of the 
PPP environments and project outcomes have varied across these settings. To explain this, we 
draw upon institutional theory and structuration theory, to analyze the evolution of the 
institutional environment and its influence on project outcomes at different points of time. 
Our results show that the institutional environment influences project outcomes and that 
context-specific factors shape the evolution of the institutional environment in different ways 
in different arenas, thereby leading to different project outcomes over time, even when the 
initial set of institutional logics surrounding PPPs are the same across these arenas. We draw 
two main conclusions: 1) policy interventions contribute to the development of the 
institutional environment positively influencing project outcomes and 2) there is path 
dependent response at the institutional level to project outcomes, linked to political 
willingness to implement enabling policy actions to foster PPP development. These results 
contribute to our understanding of the evolution of PPP enabling fields over time and the 
complex interplay between institutional regulative mechanisms and outcomes on project level.  
 
Key words: Public Private Partnerships, Institutional Theory, Structuration Theory, 
Comparative Study, Infrastructure, Case Study.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Given the key role of infrastructure in promoting economic growth governments have 
traditionally been responsible for infrastructure development (Hammami et al., 2006). 
However, over the past few decades, several countries have continuously grappled with the 
fact that their infrastructure (both its capacity and its quality) does not meet growing demands. 
Worldwide, governments face the challenge of developing assets to sustain long term 
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economic growth. Governments, therefore, are increasingly relying on private sector’s 
capacities through Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).  
PPPs often take place as a part of PPP programs under a dominant institutional 
environment. Evaluations of PPPs, to date, place emphasis on the importance of institutions, 
capacity building in PPPs and the critical goals of improving governance in PPPs. The 
challenge however is not only in creating new institutions but in also developing public 
expertise to manage projects (UNECE, 2007). Recent research has focused on institutional 
impacts on the implementation of PPP policies in different contexts, specifically the role that 
the institutional and political context plays in the process of developing PPP-enabling fields 
(Delhi et al., 2010; Jooste et al., 2011; Mu et al., 2010). Jooste et al. (2011) emphasize the 
importance of an enabling environment for the successful development of PPP programs. 
Jooste et al. (2011) note that PPPs are implemented differently in different regions and they 
state that PPP programs are shaped by the institutional and political frameworks where PPP 
development takes place. Delhi et al. (2010) present a framework which provides an 
understanding of the kinds of governance issues arising on projects which includes the 
influence of the institutional setting. They define a propitious institutional environment as a 
context where governments understand roles and responsibilities of PPPs, leading parties to 
enter into sustainable PPP arrangements where institutional structures serve as a guideline to 
achieve a coherent PPP policy, supportive risk sharing, transparency, sustainable development 
and a clear legal framework. Mu et al. (2010) state that the occurrence of undesirable parties’ 
performance is a sign of institutional deficiencies, capturing the need to improve the 
institutional setting where projects take place. Other authors focus on how project outcomes 
are influencing the successful development of PPP programs. Garvin and Bosso (2008), for 
instance, present a normative framework to establish the necessary conditions for profitable 
PPPs which heavily depend on establishing a balance between the interests of state, society, 
industry, and market.  
Despite the existence of academic contributions analyzing the interlink between 
institutions and PPP projects, little empirical research has been done that evaluates the effects 
of the evolution of the institutional environment  on project outcomes for PPPs, and the few 
comparative studies have mainly focused on contexts with similar institutional traditions 
(Aziz, 2007; Jooste et al., 2011; Petersen, 2011), placing great emphasis on the institutions 
and largely ignoring the diversity of reactions that comes from differing institutional contexts. 
In response, this paper attempts to answer the question of how the institutional environment 
affects project outcomes in PPP development in the road sector in two different contexts: the 
Netherlands and Tamil Nadu, India. We consider it essential to evaluate the way the 
institutional environment and the project structure are related. In order to improve the PPP 
environment it is important to understand how institutions influence projects and vice versa. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THIS PAPER 
This paper provides a comparative study of two environments with very different 
institutional traditions –the Netherlands and Tamil Nadu - but with very similar project 
volumes and a comparable history of PPPs in the road sector. Our main goal is to analyze the 
influence of the institutional environment on the project structures in both contexts. In this 
research, we draw upon institutional theory (Scott, 2004) to analyze this influence at different 
points of time, starting from the late 1990’s when the first PPPs were implemented in both 
environments. Our findings contribute to depict the interplay between actions and institutions 
and to address the practical problem of how to study institutional maintenance and change in 
organizations.  
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Institutional Theory 
Governments operate in an institutional environment which influences their actions. In 
this environment, the main goal of organizations is to survive not only economically, but they 
need to establish acceptability within the world they operate. Institutional theory (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995) analyzes how structures including 
procedures, rules, schemas, and routines, become established as guiding principles for social 
behavior through processes. Scott (2008) defines institutions as the symbolic frameworks that 
create shared meanings and controls that provide order to social action. Institutions 
determine how different elements are developed, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space 
and time (Scott, 2004; Scott, 2008). An important element of institutional theory is conformity 
or rational myths (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987).These rational myths  determine 
what is coherent to an organization, incorporating rules, procedures, and norms through which 
the organization pursues its mission and goals. These institutional environments are created 
by agents like national or state governments that are sufficiently powerful to impose structural 
practices such as regulations or formal procedures because of the authority they possess 
(Scott, 1987). The existing norms, regulations, and procedures are the means through which 
governments attempt to pursue their goals. These elements are the result of three types of 
institutional supports: regulative, cognitive, and normative (Scott, 1995; Henisz et al., 2012). 
Regulative supports include established understandings of public policy, procedures, laws and 
formal mechanisms. Normative supports prescribe values and norms which determine what is 
acceptable at a given environment. Cognitive elements determine the extent to which broader 
belief systems and cultural frames are imposed or adopted by organizations. Therefore, 
institutional theory embrace both the formal and informal prevalent at a given environment. 
While formal institutions are conscious guiding principles which prescribe or proscribe 
parties’ behavior (Eggertsson, 1996), it is also important to include informal rules or trust 
patterns as part of the institutional framework since behavioral patterns become 
institutionalized and informal rules become seen as given (Winch, 2010), or, as Ring and Van 
de Ven (1994) state, informal commitments become institutionalized over time due to the 
repetitive execution of acts by individuals involved. Moreover, organizations make choices 
not only based on the coercive power of punishment exerted by laws and rules, or some sort 
of social obligation. They do so because organizations are embedded in certain institutions 
and follow routines that are taken for granted as the way we do these things (Scott, 2001, 
p.57). 
More specifically, there is a reciprocal relationship between policy actions and the 
way institutions are shaped. This is grounded in Giddens’ structuration theory which 
recognizes that actors affect structure through their practices, and that structure affects the 
practices of actors (Giddens, 1984). The institutional environment shapes political processes 
and the rules of the political game (Spiller et al., 2003) and vice versa. There is a link between 
how political institutions shape political incentives, how political behavior influences policy 
making processes and their capabilities. In the case of PPPs, governments are responsible to 
establish programs and develop the necessary capacity to ensure project success.  The way a 
government shapes the environment for PPP development will depend on the institutional 
context where projects take place. The policy interventions will have an impact on the 
institutional capabilities of the environment to foster PPP development and provide an 
enabling environment (Jooste et al., 2011).  
 
PPPs and Institutional Capabilities 
Previous research has shown that the institutional environment has an impact on the 
outcomes of PPP projects (Delhi et al., 2010). Recent work has confirmed that rather than 
overcoming institutional capacity constraints, PPPs require a variety of new types of 
5 
 
institutional capacity (Jooste et al., 2011). In order to analyze the impact of the institutional 
environment, we categorize the existing regulative instruments into three “institutional 
capabilities” proposed by Mahalingam et al. (2011). These are: legitimization, trust, and 
capacity which serve as a framework for our research.  We use this model to analyze the 
influence of the institutional environment on PPP projects with the intention of refining it and 
proposing it for further research to study the interplay between the institutional and project 
outcomes. The categorization proposed by Mahalingam et al. (2011) serves as a means to 
delimit the institutional environment and characterize the institutional capabilities needed for 
PPP development so then we can compare different institutional environments.  
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995). Legitimization concerns PPPs because these projects 
introduce private operators into services that were traditionally provided by governments, and 
require large financial commitments from private parties who expect long term returns for 
their investments (Jooste et al., 2011). Strategies to build legitimization include guaranteeing 
transparency, giving strategic information, and providing a stable political environment. 
Legitimization refers to the formal actions that promote the willingness of public and private 
actors to engage in PPPs. Mahalingam et al (2011) state that governments can ensure 
legitimization through1) a clear rationale for PPPs, 2) political willingness to promote a 
proactive attitude towards PPPs, and 3) advocacy to ensure that all stakeholders are informed 
and governments make effective communication strategies available to accomplish this 
purpose.  
Trust is a disposition and attitude relating to the willingness to rely on the actions of 
other actors, under the condition of contractual and social obligations with a prospective for 
collaboration (Smyth & Pryke, 2008). In this research, we analyze trust across the interfaces 
of the PPPs, specifically the formal mechanisms that foster trust between public and private 
actors by means of standards and mechanisms implemented by the government. We agree 
with Sitkin (1995) and Zucker (1986) who state that trust and formal mechanisms are 
mutually reinforcing and contribute to the level of cooperation needed in a relationship.  
Formal mechanisms can influence trust since standard rules and procedures allow them to 
establish a pattern of behavior to base their assessments and evaluations on others (Bijlsma-
Frankema & Costa, 2005; Sitkin, 1995)making the relationships more predictable. According 
to Mahalingam et al. (2011), the key capabilities to foster trust for PPP development are 1) 
public sector predictability, and 2) ensuring public and private sectors commitment. 
Capacity to undertake PPPs will strengthen the ability to structure and govern PPP 
projects, being essential for PPP development (Mahalingam, 2011). Launching a PPP project 
requires public agencies to adopt new roles and acquire specific expertise at several levels. 
According to Mahalingam (2011) governments can improve capacity to develop PPPs by 1) 
building the necessary capacities within the public sector, 2) providing  appropriate risk and 
financing mechanisms to effectively award and govern PPP projects, and 3) enhancing private 
sector capacity. 
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Figure 1. Institutional capabilities proposed by Mahalingam et al (2011) 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
To be able to analyze the impact of the institutional environment on project outcomes 
we studied two different environments - different in legitimization, capacity and trust – but 
both with a long history of PPPs: the Netherlands and Tamil Nadu (India). We studied the 
evolution of the institutional environment in both countries over time and evaluated the 
impact on project at three different times. This enabled us to study the impact of institutional 
structures on project outcomes and vice versa. In other words, the longitudinal approach 
enabled us to study the complex interplay between institutional structures and actions in 
projects. 
The research was undertaken in four stages. The first step was to gather data about 
policy interventions in the Netherlands and Tamil Nadu. We collected publicly available 
reports, and policies mainly authored by public governmental agencies and related to the 
policy interventions for PPP development in the roads sector in both regions. This secondary 
analysis allowed us to reconstruct the historical evolution of the institutional environment for 
PPPs in both contexts. Second, we analyzed the influence of these policy interventions on the 
institutional environment. For this purpose we used the framework of Mahalingam et al. 
(2011) presented in the previous section. Table 1 displays the operationalization of  these 
institutional capabilities.  
Table 1. Template to evaluate the institutional capabilities 
Institutional capabilities Policy interventions 
LEGITIMIZATION  
Rationale  
Political willingness  
 Political champion 
 Project portfolio 
 PPP policies 
Legitimization  
• Rationale 
• Advocacy 
• Political willigness 
Trust  
• Public sector predictability 
• Public sector commitment 
• Private sector commitment 
Capacity 
• Risk and financing mechanisms 
• Public sector capacity 
• Private sector capacity 
enhancement 
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Advocacy  
 Public consultation 
TRUST  
Public sector predictability  
 Decision making departments: 
Guidance documents Project preparation and identification  guidelines 
Standard documents. 
Model contract 
 Project development responsibility 
Public sector commitment  
 Established regulatory agency 
 Standard dispute resolution mechanisms 
 Cooperation platforms 
Private sector commitment  
 Project monitoring 
 Cooperation platforms 
CAPACITY  
Public sector capacity  
 In house PPP knowledge 
 Training programs-workshops 
 Cross project knowledge 
 Guidance notes 
Risk and financing mechanisms  
 Standard risk allocation mechanisms 
 Type of contract 
 State support funding 
Private sector capacity enhancement  
 Competitive bidding 
 Cooperation 
Third, we analyzed projects over time to evaluate the project outcomes. We selected 
four available case studies in each location, comparable in terms of relative capital 
investments and contract duration. An overview of the cases is given in table 2. Our main goal 
was to select cases that took place at different points of time, so we could analyze the impact 
of the evolution of the institutional capabilities on project outcomes. To evaluate the selected 
projects we carried out exploratory interviews in the Netherlands and Tamil Nadu. Our 
interviews were semi-structured and the questions asked were both exploratory and 
descriptive in nature. We gathered information about the institutional situation during their 
involvement in PPP development, the description and structure of the projects where they 
participated, and the issues arising during these projects. We carried out 8 interviews with 
experts in the Netherlands – 3 project managers, 2 consultants and 3 public officers- and 7 in 
Tamil Nadu -2 project managers, 3 consultants and 2 public officers-. Data triangulation was 
done through validating our data with the secondary data about the projects we found in 
journal articles, governmental reports, and articles in the media.  
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Table 2. Overview of the case studies 
Number  Project title Year start 
operations 
PPP type Project investment 
Netherlands  
1 Wijkertunnel 1996 BOT Shadow toll 231 million euro 
2 A59 2005 DBFM 218 million euro 
3 A12 2014 DBFM 373 million euro 
4 A15 2015 DBFM 1095 million euro 
Tamil Nadu  
5 Coimbatore 
Bypass 
1998 BOT Toll based 16 million euro 
6 East Coast 
Road 
2002 Joint Venture and 
RIMOT- Toll based 
9 million euro 
7 IT Corridor 2008 Joint Venture and BOT 
Toll based 
58 million euro 
8 Outer Ring 
Road 
2012 DBFOT Annuity basis 159 million euro 
 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
To characterize the institutional environment in the Netherlands and Tamil Nadu, we 
first describe the PPP policy interventions that took place in both environments, emphasizing 
the events that modified the environment for PPP implementation at a certain point of time. 
We demarcate three stages where our case studies took place, and describe the institutional 
context and the project outcomes for each environment. Throughout this evolution, we 
observe that the institutional environment has an impact on project development captured in 
the different nature of project issues that we identify.  
 
Figure 2. Stages and case studies in the Netherlands and Tamil Nadu 
The Netherlands  
Space scarcity and high demands for infrastructure have a strong influence on PPP 
development in the Netherlands. This situation entails complex stakeholder involvement 
whose interests may conflict. As the client of the national water and road infrastructure, 
Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) as part of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management plays a dominant role (Lenferink & Arts, 2009). The Dutch landscape is 
increasingly influenced by European legislation reflected in procurement and planning 
Stage 1 
The Netherlands: 
Wijkertunnel 
Tamil Nadu: 
Coimbatore 
Bypass 
Stage 2 
The Netherlands: 
A59 
Tamil Nadu: East 
Coast Road and 
IT Corridor 
Stage 3 
The Netherlands: 
A12 and A15 
Tamil Nadu: 
Outer Ring Road 
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procedures and schemes as well as changing role of the government towards a more robust 
business-oriented approach.  
 
Stage 1. Introduction of PPP in the Netherlands  
During this first stage we observe that the Dutch government started developing PPPs 
in the road sector as a means to develop projects that would not have been possible without 
private investments. In the 80s, the Dutch government mentioned PPPs for the first time 
referring to the PFI concept in the UK: “a new form of public private cooperation at different 
levels of government which will aim to increase the volume of investment”(Klijn, 2009). The 
government launched two PPPs in the road sector in the early 1990’s because public funding 
was scarce and private capital was necessary to improve the national infrastructure and make 
projects possible (van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001). When the Dutch National Court of Audit 
evaluated the projects’ outcomes, they found out that these projects were more expensive than 
they had been developed through public finance: 21% more expensive for the Noordtunnel 
and 41% for the Wijkertunnel(van Ham & Koppenjan, 2001). The main reason behind it was 
that the government did not possess enough capacity to launch PPPs and the project structure 
and demands were not correct (European Commission, 2004; Klijn, 2009).  
After these experiences, the government’s interest for PPPs decreased considerably 
and they did not mention PPPs until 1998. By then, the government was again confronted 
with insufficient public funds to meet infrastructure investment needs and private 
participation was put on the political agenda (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2006; Koppenjan, 
2005). The government identified a number of projects where the private sector could be 
involved: the A4 Delft Schiedam, the A59 Geffen-Oss, the N31 Leeuwarden-Drachten, and 
the N31 Hilversum-Haarlem, the second Maasvlakte, the Betuwe-Lijn, and high-speed 
railways between Amsterdam and the Belgian and German borders including the development 
of various high-speed railway stations (Koppenjan, 2005). 
 
Wijkertunnel project  
The Wijkertunnel was a BOT shadow toll where the demand risk was borne by the 
government and maximum revenues were not capped. With increasing traffic on the road, the 
private consortia got the project return before the end of the contract. This project highlighted 
the importance of planning and procurement for project success as well as the need for public 
capacity before embarking on a complex PPP project.  
 
Stage 2. Creation of the PPP Unit and value for money 
After the first stage, the government realized the need to strengthen the institutional 
environment to provide a propitious context for PPP development. The first action was the 
publication of a report in1998, where the central government evaluated international 
experiences for PPPs and, based on this information formulated conditions for a successful 
partnership (Dutch Ministry of Finance, 1998; Klijn, 2009). As a result of these political 
statements and the increasing political willingness to implement PPPs in the Netherlands, the 
Ministry of Finance created the PPP Unit (PPP Kenniscentrumin Dutch). The Dutch 
government established this agency to encourage the use of PPPs, advise government 
agencies, and provide private companies with general information regarding PPPs (Bult-
Spiering & Dewulf, 2006). One of the main goals of the PPP Unit was to stress the 
importance of goal alignment in public agencies and create public capacity to structure and 
formulate clear and functionally specific outputs (Kenniscentrum PPS, 2002). 
In 1999, the government developed the first PPP policy. This included several 
mechanisms to support the development of PPPs emphasizing political support, guidelines 
and standards for contract and procedures, actions for market consultation, and instruments to 
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compare PPP to the traditional approach to justify the use of PPPs. The main goal of the 
government at that time was to improve the incentive structures for the use of PPP in the 
country (van Marken, 2001). Moreover, the government stressed the importance of value for 
money to improve infrastructure efficiency (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2006). Right after its 
creation, the PPP Unit was committed to assessing the evolution for PPP development in the 
country, evaluating the main problems and their potential causes. These actions contributed to 
build public support for PPPs through better knowledge dissemination, strengthening 
advocacy, and changing the government’s rationale towards achieving value for money 
through PPPs.   
In 2001, RWS launched two pilot projects (the N31 and the A59) through a DBFM 
contract, with the ambition of getting value for money through a more integrated approach for 
infrastructure development (Horchner & Ham, 2003 ). Right after these projects, the PPP Unit 
emphasized the importance of providing a project portfolio to learn based on experience and 
improve capacity (Kenniscentrum PPS, 2002). In 2002, the government published guidelines 
to identify PPP projects and ensure value for money through the Public Private Comparator 
and the Public Sector Comparator. This way, the government aimed at providing confidence 
to private investors and different levels of government.  
 
The A59 
The A59 was launched by the Province of Noord Brabant but the Dutch central 
government participated during the contract preparation. Being the first DBFM in the country, 
the government hired advisors from the UK to help the Dutch government draft the contract 
and learn from experiences in the UK (Deloitte, 2003). This was expensive and time 
consuming since the documents needed to be translated to Dutch (Koster, 2005). Besides, 
bringing in English schemes was not efficient since UK contracts are based on common law 
whereas Dutch contracts are based on civil law. Thus the first contracts were structured along 
English contractual clauses although the Dutch law was applied (Koster, 2005). Nevertheless, 
our interviewees working for the Dutch government affirmed that the contract for the A59 
served as the first step to develop the standard DBFM contract, based on Dutch civil law 
culture, more open and simple.  
Our respondents pointed out that the A59 showed the importance of goal alignment 
and cooperation for PPP development (Deloitte, 2003; Provincie Noord Brabant, 2006). 
Besides, they identified that project inefficiencies during the A59 showed the need to improve 
public capacity to successfully launch more PPPs in the country. The government analyzed 
the A59’s inefficiencies in the evaluation report of the project. These initiatives contributed to 
increase public capacity based on project experiences so that the government could implement 
a PPP program adapted to the Dutch necessities. These projects served as the first step 
towards a more programmatic approach for PPP development. This way, the government 
attempted to reduce transaction costs and times of completion (Kenniscentrum PPS, 2005) by 
increasing public sector capacity and predictability.  
 
Stage 3. The Dutch policy interventions and a new generation of PPPs 
The experiences from the A59 led to new measures to strength the institutional 
capabilities, leading to a robust environment for PPPs. PPP development in the Netherlands 
was also influenced by some measures at the European level. In 2004, the European 
Commission published the Green Paper (European Commission, 2004) addressing various 
topics associated with public procurement of PPPs, particularly the framework for the 
procedures for selection of private partners and the advantages of the competitive dialogue 
procedure
i
. Since that year, the competitive dialogue is part of the procurement instruments 
available to the contracting authority as far as member states have opted for implanting that 
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scheme (Nagelkerke et al., 2008). Since 2004, the Dutch government has procured large 
infrastructure projects in the road sector through competitive dialogue. By developing norms 
and procedures for project identification and approval, as well as standardizing procurement, 
the Dutch government contributed to increasing public sector predictability for PPP decision 
making, a fact that would positively increase private sector confidence to embark on a PPP 
project with RWS.  
Despite the encouragement of the PPP Unit to provide an active project portfolio, up 
to 2005, the only projects that were successfully implemented in the road sector were the A59 
and the N31. This project scarcity encouraged the government to analyze the causes and 
prospective remedies for this slow development. There was little understanding about the 
problems and the manner to solve them.  
In 2005, the Dutch government published the report Nota Mobiliteit (Ministerie van 
Werker en Waterstaat, 2005) which not only focused on the role of planning in infrastructure 
but also emphasized the importance of a clear procurement strategy for PPPs and a definition 
of core government, the benefits of early market involvement and capacity in the government 
to ensure lifecycle knowledge, the need to ensure social accountability by standard procedures 
like the Route Determination
ii
, and the urgency to avoid high transaction costs (Ministerie van 
Werker en Waterstaat, 2005). Again, this political statement contributed to reaffirm political 
willingness and create confidence for PPP development in the Netherlands. Besides, the 
Dutch government introduced the concept of listed risks
iii
 (Bos, 2009) to provide a standard 
procedure to discuss about the potential risks during procurement. This helped both private 
and public parties to obtain appropriate insight into the risks, their magnitude and the 
probability that they will emerge before construction. This way, RWS established a 
transparent method for risk allocation where both private and public parties can negotiate risk 
allocation for the project’s benefit. 
The Dutch government altered the structure of the PPP Unit, but this one kept 
safeguarding that the knowledge about PPP was not lost and was passed on to all involved 
parties. In 2008, the Dutch government published a report analyzing private financing of 
infrastructure in the country (Ruding, 2008). In this report, the Dutch government stated that 
the existent Dutch policy at that time was not sufficiently transparent for the choice of PPPs. 
The government highlighted that the major barriers at that time were high transaction costs, a 
lack of experience and continuity in the public side, and lack of public commitment at 
different levels of government. At that time, the government urged all departments to 
implement measures to overcome these barriers. In this year, the government published the 
DBFM handbook (ministerie van Financien, 2008) to help all governmental departments to be 
familiar with the contract. Due to the model’s novelty in the country and its complexity, the 
handbook aimed at providing a picture of the main components of a DBFM and how the 
government handles contractual issues in practice. In 2009, the government published the 
standard DBFM contract (Rijkwaterstaat, 2009) based on the knowledge and experience 
gained in previous projects that is currently used for PPP projects in the road sector. The same 
year, the government also published the guide for competitive dialogue(Rijksoverheid, 2009), 
to be used for public agencies in order to understand the different steps, procedures and 
decisions to be made during procurement.  
RWS is nowadays moving from a dominant, closed and inward-oriented organization 
towards a more transparent, customer-oriented facilitator (Van den Brink, 2009). For RWS, 
infrastructure assets are not anymore a product but a service which is the main rationale for 
them to use the DBFM contract. Nowadays, increasing the number of PPP projects and 
keeping a good project portfolio is the government’s main priority. They also consider 
lowering the threshold above a comparison of public and private funding which implies that 
local governments will also consider PPPs.   
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A12 and A15 
The A12 and A15 were procured through competitive dialogue at the end of 2009. 
Despite the efforts from the Dutch government to shorten planning and procurement by early 
market involvement and standardization, our respondents stated that planning and decision 
making take long time and entail high transaction costs in the Netherlands. Besides, our 
interviewees pointed out that there is little room for technical creativity during competitive 
dialogue, caused by several limiting public decisions such as Route Determination. Projects 
like the A12 and A15 are surrounded by existing assets; therefore they affect a range of 
stakeholders which are usually empowered. By means of the Route Determination, RWS 
takes away potential oppositions by stakeholders because, once approved, it is an irrevocable 
document. This way, the government avoids future problems with municipalities creating 
resistance by not providing the permits and approvals for the project (Van Valkenburg et al., 
2008). However, our respondents highlighted that the Route Determination is necessary but it 
obstructs private capacity by restricting innovation. Moreover, DBFM contracts, as applied in 
the A12 and A15 entail very strict requirements in terms of availability. This leads to severe 
demands from the financiers that keep contractors sharp to finish construction works in time. 
Despite the benefits of this practice that encourages private parties to be committed, our 
respondents pointed out that this kind of DBFM contract does not offer many possibilities for 
contract changes or innovation because of time pressure and availability demands. 
  
Evolution of the institutional environment for PPPs in the Netherlands 
In this section we use the template presented in Table 1 to show the influence of the 
policy interventions on the institutional capabilities and depict their evolution throughout the 
three stages. We look at changes in the institutional environment and the first stage is the 
origin of our analysis. In stage 2 and 3 we represent the policy interventions that influenced 
the institutional capabilities and the projects presented in our case studies by adding a 
“+”when this capability evolved from one stage to another. In the Netherlands we observe a 
link between the lessons obtained from the implementation of these projects and the policy 
interventions at the institutional level.   
Table 3. Evolution of the institutional capabilities in the Netherlands 
Institutional 
capabilities 
Policy interventions Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 End 
situation 
LEGITIMIZATION      
Rationale      
 Clear rationale  - + +  
 Result - + + ++ 
Political willingness      
 Political champion - + +  
 Project portfolio - + +  
 PPP policies - + +  
 Result - +++ +++ ++++++ 
Advocacy      
 Public consultation - - +  
 Result - - + + 
TRUST      
Public sector 
predictability 
     
 Decision making - - -  
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departments: 
Guidance documents Project preparation 
and identification  
guidelines 
Standard 
documents. 
Model contract 
- - +  
 Project development 
responsibility 
- - -  
 Result - - + + 
Public sector 
commitment 
     
 Established regulatory 
agency 
- - -  
 Standard dispute 
resolution mechanisms 
- - -  
 Cooperation platforms - + +  
 Result - + + ++ 
Private sector 
commitment 
     
 Project monitoring - + +  
 Cooperation platforms - + +  
 Result - ++ ++ ++++ 
CAPACITY      
Public sector capacity      
 In house PPP 
knowledge 
- - +  
 Training programs-
workshops 
- - +  
 Cross project 
knowledge 
- + +  
 Guidance notes - - +  
 Result - + ++++ +++++ 
Risk and financing 
mechanisms 
     
 Standard risk 
allocation mechanisms 
- - +  
 Type of contract - + +  
 State support funding 
distort  
- - -  
 Result - + ++ +++ 
Private sector 
capacity 
enhancement 
     
 Competitive bidding - - +  
 Cooperation - + +  
 Result - + ++ +++ 
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Tamil Nadu 
Tamil Nadu is one of the most prosperous Indian states and it is very open to private 
participation. The main motives to develop PPPs in the road sector are the required 
investments for increasing infrastructure demand. To achieve this goal, the Government of 
Tamil Nadu (GoTN) has aimed at attracting private investment and developing various PPP 
projects applying temporary measures to make projects possible when needed but lacking a 
programmatic approach  (Mahalingam, 2011).  
 
Stage 1. Introduction of PPP in Tamil Nadu 
Since the 1990’s, the Government of India (GoI) has looked at PPPs to address 
roadway development (Cherian, 2009). The first PPP project implemented in India was a toll 
road in the state of Madhya Pradesh in 1992 (Rajan  et al., 2010). Over the last two decades, 
the momentum for PPP implementation has significantly increased and diverse road projects 
have been implemented through PPPs at the national and state level. The history of PPPs in 
Tamil Nadu started in 1995, when the Ministry of Surface Transport of the GoI launched a 
global tender for the Coimbatore Bypass project. Together with the Government of Tamil 
Nadu (GoTN), they procured the project through PPPs in order to make the project possible 
by bringing private funds (Raghuram & Kheskani, 2002).  
 
Coimbatore Bypass 
In 1998, the GoTN opened the Coimbatore Bypass phase I to traffic. Right after the 
start of operations, the private concessionaire faced severe problems to collect tolls because of 
public opposition (Mahalingam & Kapur, 2009). Lack of goal alignment between public and 
private parties worsened the situation since they did not reach an agreement in subsequent 
meetings to negotiate potential solutions to solve this issue (Raghuram & Kheskani, 2002).  
 
Stage 2. Attracting private funds and second generation of PPPs 
The experiences during stage 1 did not contribute to develop a positive perception 
about PPPs in Tamil Nadu. However, the GoTN needed private funds to develop 
infrastructure, hence the GoTN launched new PPP projects during stage 2 as we saw in the 
Netherlands. During stage 2, the GoTN aimed at attracting private funds to give credibility to 
the projects.  
As a result of the generation of PPP projects in the 90’s, the GoTN introduced the 
“Tamil Nadu Transparency in Tender Act 1998” in the same year to improve transparency 
and competition. This act covers public procurement and the bidding process for public works 
and services and acts as a strong mechanism to mitigate corruption(Mahalingam, 2011). This 
initiative increased predictability for procurement, but the next large PPP projects in Tamil 
Nadu (East Coast Road and IT Corridor) were awarded through negotiated contracts with the 
TNRDC. In 1998, the first phase of the Coimbatore Bypass opened to traffic and since the 
first day there was severe reluctance to pay by the road’s users which led to GoI, GoTN and 
private consortia holding a meeting 1999 to unsuccessfully attempt to solve the situation 
(Raghuram & Kheskani, 2002).  
After the Coimbatore Bypass, the GoTN took new initiatives in order to attract private 
investment to make projects possible. Another scheme to attract private investment was the 
creation of the Tamil Nadu Road Road Development Company
iv
 (TNRDC) in 1998. TNRDC 
is a Joint Venture between the GoTN, the private partner Infrastructure Leasing & Financial 
Services Limited and other partners to develop road projects. The TNRDC is the formal 
institution for managing all aspects of road projects from preparation of feasibility and 
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engineering studies, procurement, financial modeling, and supervision of works (Mahalingam, 
2011). Since its creation, the TNRDC has stated mandates for identifying and developing 
opportunities for private investors to further legitimate PPPs in the road sector (Mahalingam, 
2011). This initiative increased public capacity to manage projects and facilitate private 
investment, since the GoTN, being one of the main shareholders, gave credibility to the 
TNRDC. Right after its creation, TNRDC started negotiations to undertake the major 
renovation and upgrade of the East Coast Road through a PPP. This agreement was signed in 
2000 (Rajan  et al., 2010).   
Given the infrastructure needs in the region for economic development, the GoTN 
drafted a road policy
v
 in 2000 which emphasizes the need to influence private capacities and 
stresses incentives that will be provided to the private player participating in infrastructure 
development. Although this draft road policy does not address issues related to PPPs, it 
mentions the need for PPPs and under which conditions these can be settled. Although 
published in the early 2000’s and expected to be finalized shortly, this road policy still 
appears as a draft in the Tamil Nadu Highways department website.  
In 2000, the GoTN signed a concession agreement with TNRDC as one of the early 
PPP initiatives in the state for the East Coast Road. This was the first PPP in India to use PPP 
for road renovation and maintenance, getting much public attention. For the East Coast Road 
project, the TNRDC took action to make the project possible and amended the existing toll 
policy to levy two-lane roads (Rajan A. et al., 2010). In 2001, the GoTN launched the 
Highways Act 2001, which facilitates PPP by empowering GoTN to enter into agreements 
with the private sector for the construction, development, and maintenance of an asset after 
consulting with the State Highways Authority
vi
 (Economic Consulting Associates et al., 
2005).  Besides, this act addresses issues arising due to land acquisition or other issues having 
a social and economic impact that are the responsibility of the GoTN. For the East Coast 
Road, the Highways Act ensured that land acquisition litigations were in favor of the TNRDC 
and the GoTN, a fact that facilitated the process (Mahalingam, 2011).  
In 2003, the Tamil Nadu Road Sector Project
vii
 (TNRSP) was implemented with the 
World Bank Loan Assistance aiming at improving the quality and sustainability of the state’s 
road network. Like the TNRDC, the TNRSP was created with a directive to promote 
infrastructure investment in the state and to tender technical assistance for project 
development but not as a PPP option. The past experiences in PPP projects encouraged new 
forms of promoting infrastructure in Tamil Nadu.  
Given the large infrastructure needs in the country, the GoI is committed to 
encouraging the use of PPPs as a means to bring private resources and meet the resource 
deficit. Therefore, the GoI is encouraging PPPs not only at the national level, but also at the 
state level(Government of India, 2007, 2008). While promoting PPPs, the GoI also identifies 
constraints at the state level such as: the absence of PPP friendly policies and regulations, lack 
of capacity at the public sector to manage the PPP process and fully meet the challenge of 
launch of a large number of projects, lack of credible-bankable infrastructure projects, lack of 
market instruments to meet the long-term equity and debt financing needed by infrastructure 
projects, and inadequate advocacy to create acceptance of PPPs by the stakeholders.  
 
The East Coast Road and IT Corridor 
In 2000, the TNRDC signed the agreement to develop the East Coast Road. In 2002, 
operations for the East Coast Road started. The GoTN was again faced with reluctance to pay. 
Although the GoTN and TNRDC agreed on increasing the toll tariff by 8% every year, once 
public opposition started, the GoTN was unwilling to implement the tariff’s increase, causing 
financial problems for the project in the long run (Rajan A. et al., 2010). This weak public 
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commitment generated some tensions among public and private parties to provide a propitious 
environment for PPP development.   
In the early 2000’s, the GoTN planned to improve the Old Mahabalipuram Road (also 
known as IT Corridor or Rajiv Gandhi Salai), together with the development of an important 
industrial center in the area (Mahalingam & Kapur, 2009). Due to the project’s size, they 
decided to bring private funds by launching a PPP. In 2004, the GoTN published the public 
statement for the IT Corridor which was developed by the TNRDC. Learning from the 
experience of the East Coast Road, the GoTN and the private company negotiated to 
automatically increase the toll tariff by 8% per year, without government’s approval(Delhi et 
al., 2010). The expected year of operations commencement was 2005; however, phase I did 
not open until 2008 because of significant delays. In 2008, the GoTN partially opened the IT 
corridor to traffic; to date several components, including lanes, footpaths and works for water 
supply, sewerage, and electricity are yet to be completed. Despite the fact that the GoTN 
learnt from the East Coast Road and for this project toll tariffs were automatically reviewed 
(Mahalingam, 2010); delays and cost escalation negatively influenced the already spoiled 
perception about PPPs in both the public and private sectors.   
 
Stage 3. Recent developments 
Due to the unsuccessful development of projects like the East Coast Road or IT 
Corridor, the GoTN has stopped initiatives to promote PPPs at the state level and we observe 
that projects are now awarded through annuities. The second phase of the IT Corridor is a 
good example. In 2009, the GoTN took over the private party’s equity for the IT Corridor and 
restructured the JV. The GoTN announced that phase II will be developed through an annuity 
(availability) contract. 
The evolution we observe in this stage comes mainly from the enthusiasm of the GoI 
to provide infrastructure through PPPs. In 2009, the GoI published the Model Concession 
Agreement (MCA) (Government of India, 2009) for PPPs in State Highways to provide a 
standard document for projects under the DBFOT model. This model concession agreement is 
used for projects included in national programs but also for other PPPs in order to help state 
governments increase public capacity. This initiative reflects best practices and can sustain 
investor interest. It sets out a precise policy and regulatory framework addressing the essential 
issues for PPPs, such as risk allocation, incentives, roles and responsibilities, transaction 
costs, force majeure, monitoring, dispute resolution, and financial support from the 
government. Besides, in the attempt to encourage PPPs, the GoI elaborated a PPP toolkit 
which covers State Highways amongst other sectors
viii
 (Government of India, 2010-2011). 
This toolkit provides explanatory and reference material about PPPs through phases, from 
identification to operation, offering a set of decision-making tools to help public officers at 
different stages of the PPP process. In 2010, the GoTN published a road policy note 
(Government of Tamil Nadu, 2009-2010), where the government very briefly encourages 
developing roads with heavy traffic through PPPs.  
 
Outer Ring Road 
Given the fast growth in the city of Chennai over recent years, the GoTN is expecting 
the existing roads to be congested in the upcoming years; thus, in 2009 the GoTN launched 
the tender for the Outer Ring Road through competitive tendering. This project is developed 
under a DBFOT on annuity basis following the Model Concession Agreement elaborated by 
the GoI. It is not a toll road since the GoTN’s intention is to reduce traffic congestion in the 
city and, based on previous experiences, the GoTN fears that charging tolls would negatively 
influence traffic demand for the road.  
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Evolution of the institutional environment in Tamil Nadu  
Table 4 shows the evolution of the institutional capabilities in Tamil Nadu. As for the 
Netherlands, we look at changes in the institutional environment and the first stage is the 
origin of our analysis. In stage 2 and 3, we represent the policy actions that affected the 
institutional capabilities and the projects presented in our case studies by adding a “+”when 
this capability evolved from one stage to another. After the Coimbatore Bypass, political 
willingness decreased in Tamil Nadu. Due to external circumstances (need of private funds), 
the government brought the PPP scheme again. Through the evolution of the stages we 
observe a stagnant institutional environment where the government implemented few 
measures at the institutional level, most of them related to capacity. 
Table 4. Evolution of the institutional capabilities in Tamil Nadu 
Institutional 
capabilities 
Policy interventions Stage 
1 
Stage 2 Stage 3 End 
situation 
LEGITIMIZATION      
Rationale      
 Clear rationale  - - -  
 Result - - - - 
Political willingness      
 Political champion - - -  
 Project portfolio - + +  
 PPP policies - - -  
 Result - + + ++ 
Advocacy      
 Public consultation - - -  
 Result - - - - 
TRUST      
Public sector 
predictability 
     
 Decision making 
departments: 
- - -  
Guidance documents Project preparation 
and identification  
guidelines 
Standard documents. 
Model contract 
- - +  
 Project development 
responsibility 
- - -  
 Result - - + + 
Public sector 
commitment 
     
 Established regulatory 
agency 
- - -  
 Standard dispute 
resolution mechanisms 
- - -  
 Cooperation platforms - - -  
 Result - - - - 
Private sector 
commitment 
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 Project monitoring - - -  
 Cooperation platforms - - -  
 Result - - - - 
CAPACITY      
Public sector capacity      
 In house PPP knowledge - - -  
 Training programs-
workshops 
- + -  
 Cross project knowledge - - -  
 Guidance notes - - +  
 Result - + + ++ 
Risk and financing 
mechanisms 
     
 Standard risk allocation 
mechanisms 
- - -  
 Type of contract - - +  
 State support funding 
distort  
- + +  
 Result - + ++ +++ 
Private sector 
capacity 
enhancement 
     
 Competitive bidding - - -  
 Cooperation - - -  
 Result - - - - 
 
DISCUSSION 
The starting point of our research was to analyze the influence of the institutional 
environment on PPP projects. With this purpose, we have analyzed the institutional 
environment in two contexts: the Netherlands and Tamil Nadu. We have also studied four 
different projects in each location which took place at different points of time noting that the 
institutional environment is variable and it evolves a result of policy implementations over 
time. 
We aim at evaluating how institutions influence project characteristics, acknowledging 
that actions create, maintain and change institutions in return. Specifically, we observe that 
the institutional environment influences the contract structure, the duration of negotiations for 
planning and procurement, or the emergence of public opposition. We also observe that 
project outcomes provide some lessons and actors assess these project outcomes and then 
strategize. Starting from a similar degree of maturity, there is a completely different evolution 
of the PPP environment in the Netherlands and Tamil Nadu. In the Netherlands, the 
institutional environment has evolved since the implementation of the first PPP in the country 
as a consequence of several policy interventions, whereas the environment has remained 
relatively stagnant in Tamil Nadu. This is reflected in the type of issues that arise during 
project development. In the Netherlands we observe a link between the lessons obtained from 
the project level and policy intervention at the institutional level. The Dutch government has 
adopted a pro-active attitude to improve the institutional environment and learn based on 
project experiences. Particularly, political willingness has contributed to make PPPs so that a 
programmatic approach could follow. The Dutch government has invested resources in 
evaluation reports, standard procedures and mechanisms, and cooperation platforms to 
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evaluate PPP’s evolution, their problems and potential causes. We display this relationship in 
figure 3.  
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Private sector commitment: ++
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Political willigness: +++ 
Advocacy: + 
Trust
Public sector predictability: + 
Public sector commitment: + 
Private sector commitment: ++
Capacity
Public sector capacity: ++++ 
Risk/financing mechanisms: ++
Private sector capacity: ++ 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between the institutional environment and project outcomes in 
the Netherlands 
However, in Tamil Nadu we do not observe such a link between the lessons obtained 
from project experience and changes in the institutional environment. While the GoTN has 
been promoting private investment and the government has attracted private companies by the 
booming economy in the region, experiences such as the Coimbatore Bypass, the East Coast 
Road, and the IT Corridor have created rejection and distrust among private and public 
parties. Throughout the three different stages we observe measures at the state and national 
level to facilitate project financing and give credibility to projects. However, we observe a 
stagnant institutional environment to build public capacity. In Tamil Nadu, there were also 
lessons learnt from the implementation of projects, but the government has not applied them. 
On the contrary, negative experiences have negatively affected political willingness to 
implement measures which could improve project development. The GoTN has faced a lack 
of public capacity and extensive mistrust among public officers and tax-payers of the 
profitmaking aspect of PPPs. We display this relationship in figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Relationship between the institutional environment and project outcomes in 
Tamil Nadu 
The analysis of the institutional environment in the Netherlands and Tamil Nadu over 
time shows that institutions are dynamic and change over time. We bring some evidence of 
the influence that project outcomes have on institutions. These results link our research results 
to structuration theory (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Giddens, 1984) and some recent research 
about PPP development (Jooste et al., 2011) which draw attention to the interplay between the 
institutional context, material systems, and the mechanisms of change. They state that the 
institutional environment has an influence in the events in the realm of action (project level) 
and the outcomes of the realm of action will change the institutional environment in return. 
This interaction between the realm of action and the institutional environment is very 
different in the Netherlands and Tamil Nadu. PPPs are “embedded” in the institutional 
environment, different in each location, which have a different effect on the types of issues 
that arise during project development and the reaction of organizations to these issues. This 
research results are also in line with Garvin and Bosso (2008) since we observe that project 
outcomes influence the programmatic implementation of PPP projects. We agree with 
Suchman (1995) saying that the institutional construction takes place on the level at which the 
problem is perceived. In both environments there were some lessons coming from the project 
implementation but these lessons were interpreted differently in Tamil Nadu and the 
Netherlands.  The stagnant environment in Tamil Nadu is a result of a resistance to change 
coming from a lack of willingness to implement PPPs in the state. However, the Dutch 
government has used political willingness as a means to provide a programmatic approach for 
PPPs.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main goal of this research was to evaluate how the institutional environment 
influences project development in PPPs in the road sector. We have found that the 
institutional environment has an influence at the project level. Besides, we have observed that 
the Dutch and Tamil environment have evolved differently, being perceptible in project 
development. Based on our results we can draw two main conclusions: 1) policy interventions 
contribute to the development of the institutional environment positively influencing project 
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outcomes and 2) there is a path dependent response at the institutional level to project 
outcomes, directly linked to political willingness to implement enabling policy actions to 
foster PPP development.  
The institutional environment has an on contract structure, the duration of negotiations 
for planning and procurement, and the emergence of public opposition. Projects’ outcomes 
result in lessons learnt. The influence of the institutional environment on project outcomes 
and context specific factors shape the evolution of the institutional environment in different 
ways in different arenas, thereby leading to diverse project outcomes over time, even when 
the initial set of institutional logics surrounding PPPs are the same across these arenas.  
These results contribute to our understanding of the evolution of PPP enabling fields 
over time and the complex interplay between institutional regulative mechanisms and 
outcomes on project level. By studying longitudinally the PPP institutional field on the one 
hand and the evolution of projects on the other, we are able to analyze how this interplay took 
place. Figure 5 displays a model which allows us to represent the evolution of the institutional 
environment and its influence at the project level.  
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Figure 5. Proposed model for the evolution of the institutional environment through 
different stages 
Institutions influence the realm of action and events in the realm of action influence 
institutions in return (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). Throughout the model, we observe to what 
extent these lessons change the institutional environment for the next stage or project 
generation so there is a direct correlation between project and institutional levels through the 
stages. Our research results show some evidence of the influence of project outcomes on the 
institutional environment, generating reluctance or willingness as a result of the experiences 
implementing PPPs. Comparing PPP development in The Netherlands and Tamil Nadu we 
observe that the different evolution of the institutional environments is a result of the program 
progress, directly linked to the political willingness to implement measures at the institutional 
level based on the lessons learnt from past experiences. In our cases, when political 
willingness is positive, governments are receptive to learn lessons obtained from previous 
projects and implement measures accordingly. However, in an environment where political 
willingness is not favorable, the institutional capabilities will remain stagnant and not applied 
for project development. This finding is in line with the principle of structuration theory 
which states that institutions organize actions and acknowledging that actions create, maintain 
and change institutions in return. Moreover, structuration theory focuses on the dynamics by 
which institutions are modified. In this paper we have provided an analysis to show how both 
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theories complement each other and provide useful insights for PPP development. We 
encourage further research comparing different environments to evaluate the influence of the 
institutional capabilities at the project level, and more especially, how project outcomes 
influence institutions in return.  
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Appendix 1. Evolution of the Institutional Capabilities in the Netherlands  
LEGITIMIZATION  1
st
 stage 
1990-2000 
2
nd
 stage 
2001-2003 
3
rd
 stage 
2004-2011 
Rationale     
  Project urgency Project urgency and value 
for money 
Value for money 
Political willingness     
 Political champion No mechanisms PPPs Kenniscentrum PPS Kennispool 
 Project portfolio No mechanism First DBFM in the 
Netherlands  
Improved project portfolio: 2
nd
Coen Tunnel, 
A12, A15, N33, Schiphol-Amsterdam-Almere 
Projects included in the Urgency Approach 
 PPP policies No mechanisms First PPP Policy, Nota 
Mobiliteit, Ruding Report. 
Active PPP Unit 
Active PPP Unit 
Publication guidelines, procedures, standard 
documents 
Advocacy     
 Public consultation No data Route Determination 
Public consultation  
Route Determination 
Public consultation  
Early market involvement 
TRUST     
Public sector 
predictability 
    
 Decision making 
departments: 
Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Transport 
and RWS 
Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Transport and 
RWS 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Transport and 
RWS 
Guidance documents Project preparation 
and identification  
guidelines 
Standard documents. 
Model contract 
No mechanisms 
 
Project basis 
First DBFM 
 
Guidelines PSC and PPC 
Market scan 
Standard DBFM P 
Procurement through competitive dialogue  
 Project development 
responsibility 
RWS RWS RWS 
Public sector 
commitment 
    
 Established regulatory 
agency 
Dutch civil law  
Clause reasonableness 
Dutch civil law 
Clause reasonableness and 
Dutch civil law 
Clause reasonableness and fairness 
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and fairness fairness  
 Standard dispute 
resolution mechanisms 
No data Contract: International 
dispute resolution 
mechanisms 
Contract: International dispute resolution 
mechanisms 
 Cooperation platforms No data Alignment meetings, open 
debate 
Open debate, cooperation platforms 
Private sector 
commitment 
    
 Project monitoring Contract DBFM availability based, 
strict requirements 
DBFM availability based, strict requirements 
 Cooperation platforms No data Alignment meetings, open 
debate 
Open debate, cooperation platforms, open 
debate 
CAPACITY     
Public sector 
capacity 
    
 In house PPP knowledge Consultants hired from 
the  UK 
Consultants hired form the 
UK 
In house knowledge, active PPP Unit 
 Training programs-
workshops 
No mechanisms No mechanisms Organized by the PPP Unit 
 Cross project knowledge No mechanisms First evaluation report Evaluation reports 
 Guidance notes No mechanisms No mechanisms DBFM handbook, guidelines for competitive 
dialogue, guidelines for PSC and PPC 
Risk and financing 
mechanisms 
    
 Standard risk allocation 
mechanisms 
Risks negotiated Risks negotiated Listed risks  
 Type of contract BOT Shadow toll Availability based DBFM Availability DBFM 
 State support funding No mechanisms No mechanisms No mechanisms 
Private sector 
capacity 
enhancement 
    
 Competitive bidding Competitive 
procurement 
Competitive procurement Competitive dialogue, early market 
involvement 
 Cooperation No data Alignment meetings, open 
debate 
Open debate, cooperation platforms 
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Appendix 2. Case Studies in the Netherlands  
Project Project outcomes Lessons learnt 
Wijkertunnel Project 41% more 
expensive than 
developed by the 
public sector  
Importance of planning and procurement for project 
success 
Importance of developing public capacity before 
embarking on a complex PPP project 
A59 Delays in planning 
and procurement 
High transaction 
costs 
PPPs are a learning process 
Need for cooperation and knowledge transfer to 
increase public and private capacity 
Need to keep in-house knowledge 
A12 and A15 High transaction 
costs 
Long planning and 
procurement 
Innovation versus 
proven technology 
Need to enhance private sector capacity 
Need to minimize transaction costs and planning and 
procurement 
Need to increase knowledge transfer during different 
project stages by avoiding the “changing-teams” 
issue 
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Appendix 3. Evolution of Institutional Capabilities in Tamil Nadu 
LEGITIMIZATION  1
st
 stage 
1990-1998 
2
nd
 stage 
199-2008 
3
rd
 stage 
2009-2011 
Rationale     
  Urgency Need for private funds Need for private funds, efficiency gains 
Political willingness     
 Political champion No mechanisms No mechanisms No mechanisms 
 Project portfolio Coimbatore Bypass Karur Toll bridge, East 
Coast Road, and IT Corridor 
Outer Ring Road 
 PPP policies Policies to attract 
private investment 
Initiatives by GoI at the 
state level, policies to attract 
private investment 
Initiatives by GoI at the state level, policies to 
attract private investment 
Advocacy     
 Public consultation No mechanisms No mechanisms No mechanisms 
TRUST     
Public sector 
predictability 
    
 Decision making 
departments: 
State Highways 
department Tamil Nadu 
Project identification and 
approval: State Highways 
Department of Tamil Nadu 
and TNRSP 
Project identification and approval: State 
Highways Department of Tamil Nadu and 
TNRSP 
Guidance documents Project preparation 
and identification  
guidelines 
Standard documents. 
Model contract 
State Highways 
department of Tamil 
Nadu 
Case to case basis 
No mechanisms 
TNRDC, Transparency Act 
1998, Highways Act 2001 
Case to case basis 
No mechanisms 
TNRDC, Model concession agreement by GoI, 
procedures and documents by GoI 
 Project development 
responsibility 
State Highways, 
department Tamil Nadu  
TNRDC TNRDC 
Public sector 
commitment 
    
 Established regulatory 
agency 
No mechanisms No mechanisms No mechanisms 
 Standard dispute 
resolution mechanisms 
Included in the contract Included in the contract Included in the contract 
 Cooperation platforms No mechanisms No mechanisms No mechanisms 
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Private sector 
commitment 
    
 Project monitoring Included in the contract Included in the contract Included in the contract 
 Cooperation platforms No mechanisms No mechanisms No mechanisms 
CAPACITY     
Public sector 
capacity 
    
 In house PPP knowledge Hired consultants Hired consultants 
Creation of TNRDC 
Creation TNRSP 
Hired consultants 
 
 Training programs-
workshops 
No mechanisms Workshop in 2008 No mechanisms 
 Cross project knowledge No mechanisms No mechanisms No mechanisms 
 Guidance notes No mechanisms No mechanisms Toolkits and guidance by GoI 
Risk and financing 
mechanisms 
    
 Standard risk allocation 
mechanisms 
Case to case basis Case to case basis Case to case basis 
 Type of contract BOT Toll based BOT toll based Annuity model (Model concession agreement 
by GoI) 
 State support funding -- VGF by GOI VGF by GoI 
Private sector 
capacity 
enhancement 
    
 Competitive bidding Competitive bidding Negotiated contracts 
Transparency Act 1998 
Competitive bidding 
 Cooperation No mechanisms No mechanisms No mechanisms 
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Appendix 4. Case Studies in Tamil Nadu 
 
 
 
 
 
Project Project outcomes Lessons learnt 
Coimbatore 
Bypass 
Public opposition to 
pay.  
Costs overruns.  
Lack of value for 
money.  
 
Need for goal alignment between public and private 
parties and effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
Importance of planning and procurement for project 
success 
Need for public consultation processes 
East Coast 
Road and IT 
Corridor 
Costs overruns 
Lack of value for 
money 
Delays 
Increasing accidents 
Need for goal alignment between public and private 
parties and effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
Need to reduce political interference and need for 
public sector commitment 
Need for public consultation processes 
Outer Ring 
Road 
Delays in project 
planning 
Need for goal alignment between public and private 
parties and effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
Need to reduce political interference and need for 
public sector commitment 
Need to shorten time for permits and approvals 
Importance for planning and procurement for project 
success 
Need for public consultation processes  
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Notes 
 
                                                          
i
The competitive dialogue is a procurement procedure which aims at preserving competition 
and allowing the contracting authorities to discuss aspect of the contract with the bidders 
(Rijksoverheid, 2009). The competitive dialogue procedure allows for pre-bid individual 
negotiation with selected bidders, which makes it different from the common open or 
restricted procedure. The government and the bidder appoint in a dialogue over the public 
requests and the proposed private solution (Lenferink et al., 2010). Involving bidders at early 
stages of the project promotes cooperation about essential contract aspects like risk allocation 
(European Commission, 2004). 
ii
During project planning the government always develops the so-called Route Determination 
which gives the authority to make decisions regarding permits and approvals under the Dutch 
Infrastructure Act. This Route Determination includes all potential requirements for the 
project and attempts to safeguard the interests of residents, the environment, and important 
stakeholders. Its main key values are openness to the public, public consultation, and advice. 
iii
 Listed risks are risks that have a direct impact on the project. They are distributed during the 
dialogue between the government and private parties. If the private party decides not to bear 
the risk, the value of the bid will increase whereas if the risk is taken by the  private company, 
the government compensates the PSC (Franken, 2010) 
iv
 http://tnrdc.com/ 
v
http://www.tnhighways.org/road%20policy.htm 
vi 
The State Highways Department of Tamil Nadu is headed by the Minister of Highways and 
Minor Ports Department and it is in charge of the State Highways and District Roads.  The 
Highways Department is the main institution responsible for the improvement and 
maintenance of State roads and National roads that fall under the GoTN jurisdiction 
(Mahalingam, 2011). 
vii 
http://tnrsp.com/ 
viii
http://toolkit.pppinindia.com/ 
 
